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THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1994
Allen W. Bird II*
Judge James G. Mixon**
Brian Rosenthal***
I. INTRODUCTION
On October 22, 1994, President Clinton signed into law H.R.
5116, an Act entitled "Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994."' This
article discusses some of the more widely applicable and momentous
changes contained in the Act. As used in this article, the term "Act"
will mean the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, and the terms
"Bankruptcy Code" or "Code" will mean 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.,
either pre- or post-Act.
II. AUTOMATIC STAY
When a bankruptcy petition is filed, Section 362(a) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code stays certain actions against a debtor and property of
a debtor's estate. 2 This automatic stay is a well known and essential
feature of bankruptcy law. A creditor can obtain relief from the
automatic stay by filing a motion with the bankruptcy court pursuant
to Section 362(d).
3
Section 362(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, as amended, provides:
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1. Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994).
2. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988).
3. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1988); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(a).
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(e) Thirty days after a request under subsection (d) of this section
for relief from the stay of any act against property of the estate
under subsection (a) of this section, such stay is terminated with
respect to the party in interest making such request, unless the
court, after notice and a hearing, orders such stay continued in
effect pending the conclusion of, or as a result of, a final hearing
and determination under subsection (d) of this section. The court
shall order such stay continued in effect pending the conclusion
of the final hearing under subsection (d) of this section if there
is a reasonable likelihood that the party opposing relief from
such stay will prevail at the conclusion of such final hearing. If
the hearing under this subsection is a preliminary hearing, then
such final hearing shall be [commenced] concluded not later than
thirty days after the conclusion of such preliminary hearing [.],
unless the 30-day period is extended with the consent of the
parties in interest or for a specific time which the court finds is
required by compelling circumstances.
4
Before the amendment to Section 362(e), if the court failed to
commence a preliminary hearing within 30 days from the date the
motion for relief from stay was filed, or failed to commence a final
hearing after 30 additional days, the stay automatically terminated.'
Section 362(e) did not compel the court to conclude the final hearing
within a certain time frame, making it possible to continue resolution
of the issue of relief from stay indefinitely.
When the strict time constraints of pre-amended Section 362(e)
were not met, some courts looked to the facts and circumstances
of cases in order to reimpose the automatic stay to protect the
debtor.6 Because the protections of Section 362(e) are for the creditor,7
circumstances that indicate that a creditor has acted in a manner
inconsistent with these time constraints have been used as an implied
waiver of Section 362(e) protections.'
4. 11 U.S.C. § 362(e) (1988). The new language is italicized, and the deleted
portion is included in brackets.
5. In re Hale, 128 B.R. 310, 312 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1991).
6. Metmor Fin., Inc. v. Bailey (In re Bailey), Ill B.R. 151, 154 (W.D. Tenn.
1988) (finding no abuse of discretion where bankruptcy court reimposed the stay
due to the facts and circumstances of the case).
7. In re Looney, 823 F.2d 788, 793 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
977 (1987).
8. In re Bogosian, 114 B.R. 7 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1990) (involving an implied
waiver where the creditor did not object to continuances of the final hearing). See
also In re Wedgewood Realty Group, 878 F.2d 693, 698-99 (3d Cir. 1989), where
the court cites the following examples of implied waiver cases: Borg-Warner Ac-
ceptance Corp. v. Hall, 685 F.2d 1306, 1308 (lth Cir. 1982) (involving an implied
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Some courts have terminated the stay if a hearing was not
scheduled within the time constraints of Section 362(e) even though
the hearing was not scheduled due to the court's inadvertence or
through no fault of the debtor.9 Even after the stay has terminated,
a debtor may seek an injunction under Section 105(a) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code to stay creditor action. 0 Both parties must carefully
waiver where the creditor attended the final hearing outside of time constraints
but did not object); In re McNeely, 51 B.R. 816, 821 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985)
(regarding an implied waiver where the creditor did not schedule a final hearing
within 30 days of the preliminary hearing); In re Small, 38 B.R. 143, 147 (Bankr.
D. Md. 1984) (concerning an implied waiver where the creditor filed discovery that
allowed debtor to file responses after 30 day period had run).
9. In re River Hills Apartments Fund, 813 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1987). It is the
debtor's burden to monitor relief from stay proceedings and seek a stay continuance
or hearing within the time frames through "aggressive litigation management." Id.
at 707. See In re Looney, 823 F.2d at 792 (stating that if no ruling has been made
within 30 days from the initial motion filing date, then the stay is automatically
terminated). The reason for the automatic termination rule was to prevent parties
from having hearings continued and thus, in effect, continuing the stay. The hearing
must be at least commenced within 30 days following the preliminary hearing, and
the court must expressly continue the stay. Legislative history supports the prop-
osition that simply requiring the hearings to be commenced within 30 days was
not providing for speedy enough resolutions, so that the amendment now states
that the final hearing must be concluded within this time frame except in exceptional
cases. 140 CONG. REc. 10,764 (1994).
In In re Wedgewood Realty Group Ltd., 878 F.2d 693 (3d Cir. 1989), the
court noted that technically violating the time constraints of Section 362(e) and
Bankruptcy Rule 4001(a)(2) (subsequently amended) results in the automatic ter-
mination of the stay. Id. at 697 (citing Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, H. REP.
No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 344 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6300).
Old Bankruptcy Code § 362(e) required a preliminary or final hearing within
30 days. If the hearing was preliminary, then the stay had to be expressly continued,
and a final hearing had to be commenced within 30 days of the preliminary hearing.
Under Rule 4001(a)(2), the stay then expired unless the motion for relief was denied
within an additional 30 day period. Because a continuance was authorized under
the statute as long as the final hearing had been commenced, the rules were
inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code. The rule was deleted as unnecessary because
of Bankruptcy Code § 362(e). In re SeSide Co., 155 B.R. 112, 115 n.2. (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1993).
10. Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides, "The court may issue any
order, process or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions
of this title." 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988).
The court in the case of In re Orfa Corp., 170 B.R. 257 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1994), agreed that Section 105 is an appropriate means for continuing the stay
when it is not the debtor's fault that the time constraints have been missed. Here,
because of a local rule, the creditor was required to serve notice of the hearing,
which it did not do until after the initial 30 day period. Under the River Hills
analysis, however, the court may have deemed the debtor also responsible for not
closely monitoring its situation to insure that a hearing was scheduled within 30
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monitor litigation concerning motions for relief from stay and clearly
understand whether the hearing is preliminary or final for purposes
of appeal."
The amendments to Section 362(e) make it clear that the bank-
ruptcy court may only authorize an extension that results in the
final hearing being concluded more than 30 days after the preliminary
hearing under exceptional circumstances. 12 In other words, the entire
motion for relief from stay process typically should be completed
within 60 days from the time a creditor files a motion for relief
from stay. The legislative history indicates that exceptional circum-
stances will be limited to illnesses or other meritorious circumstances,
with the ultimate goal being to avoid delay and fairly balance the
parties' interests. 3
III. JURY TRIALS
May non-Article III appointed judges constitutionally conduct
jury trials? This question was left unanswered by the Supreme Court
in Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 14 where the Court addressed a party's
right to a jury trial in a core bankruptcy proceeding.' 5 Subsequent
to Granfinanciera, seven circuit courts reviewed this question; six
courts concluded that bankruptcy judges do not have authority to
conduct jury trials, while one circuit court concluded that bankruptcy
courts do have such authority. 16 The Act resolves the jury trial issue
by providing a limited right to a jury trial in bankruptcy court.
days. River Hills, 813 F.2d at 704.
Under Bankruptcy Rule 7065, in order to obtain such a Section 105 stay, the
debtor must prove a substantial likelihood of success; irreparable harm to the
debtor if the stay is not continued; that the harm to the debtor is greater than
the harm that might result to the party that requested relief fo he stay;
that continued injunctive relief does not violate the public interest.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1988).
12. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 101, 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 4106, 4107 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 362(e)). The amended
section allows for an extension when the court finds it is required by "compelling
circumstances." Id.
13. The committee report states, "The committee believes speedy conclusion of
hearings on the automatic stay will reduce the time and cost of bankruptcy pro-
ceedings by preventing unjustified or unwarranted postponements of final action."
140 CONG. REc. 10,764 (1994).
14. 492 U.S. 33, 64 (1989).
15. Core proceedings are defined at 28 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
16. 140 CONG. REC. 10,766 (1994) (citing five circuit court cases which held
that bankruptcy courts do not have such authority). A sixth circuit court reached
that same conclusion the day before the administrative record was made, when the
Fifth Circuit decided In re Clay, 35 F.3d 190 (5th Cir. 1994). Therefore, the circuit
[Vol. 17:387
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Section 112 of the Act adds a new subsection to 28 U.S.C.
§ 157, which provides as follows:
If the right to a jury trial applies in a proceeding that may be
heard under this section by a bankruptcy judge, the bankruptcy
judge may conduct the jury trial if especially designated to exercise
such jurisdiction by the district court and with the express consent
of all the parties. 7
Therefore, if a local district court rule authorizes a bankruptcy
judge to conduct a jury trial, and if all the parties consent, the
bankruptcy judge may conduct a jury trial. This legislation closely
matches the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal's review of these issues
in In re Clay.8 That court noted that if a party has a Seventh
Amendment right to a trial by jury, the safeguards inherent in
Article III of the Constitution cannot be abrogated without express
congressional mandate or the parties' consent.' 9 The Clay court also
noted certain exceptions to Article III, including situations in which
"Article I courts may hear cases involving 'public rights,' which are
rights against the government or closely intertwined with a regulatory
scheme.' '20
courts which have held that bankruptcy courts cannot hold jury trials include: In
re Clay, 35 F.3d 190 (5th Cir. 1994); In re Stansbury Poplar Place, Inc., 13 F.3d
122 (4th Cir. 1993); In re Grabill Corp., 967 F.2d 1152 (7th Cir. 1992); In re
Baker & Betty Fin. Servs., 954 F.2d 1169 (6th Cir. 1992); Kaiser Steel Corp. v.
Frates, 911 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1990); and In re United Missouri Bank, 901 F.2d
1449 (8th Cir. 1990). The sole circuit to conclude that bankruptcy courts have the
authority to conduct jury trials is the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in In re
Ben Cooper, Inc., 896 F.2d 1394 (2d Cir. 1990), vacated, 498 U.S. 964 (1990).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 157(e) (1988).
18. 35 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1994).
19. Id. at 196, 198. Article III of the Constitution provides:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the congress may from time to time
ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the Supreme and inferior Courts,
shall hold their Offices during good behaviour, and shall, at stated times,
receive for their services, compensation, which shall not be diminished
during their continuance in office.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
The Seventh Amendment provides that "[in suits at common law, where the
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury, shall
be preserved." U.S. CONST. amend. VII. In In re Clay, the court stated, "[W]e
are not persuaded that Congress would have challenged such formidable consti-
tutional principles by innuendo." 35 F.3d at 198.
20. In re Clay, 35 F.3d at 192 (citing Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods.,
473 U.S. 568, 593-94 (1985); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Co.,
458 U.S. 50, 67-70 (1982) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion)). The other two instances
where jury trials may be conducted by non-Article III courts include courts for
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Part of the confusion about whether bankruptcy core proceedings
qualify under the public rights exception was created by the Supreme
Court's statement in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Co. that core proceedings "may well be" public rights cases.2
The Clay court concluded that regardless of whether the proceeding
is core or non-core, if a party has a constitutional right to trial by
jury under the Seventh Amendment, 2  "Congress may not give
jurisdiction to a non-Article III court." ' 23 In reaching this conclusion,
the Fifth Circuit rejected the argument that such proceedings are
part of the public's interest in a controlled regulatory framework
in bankruptcy and that a bifurcating opportunity for a jury trial in
a district court would prove inefficient. 24 In addition, the Fifth Circuit
stated that a litigant has supreme power over its right to a jury
trial. In other words, just because a party has a right to a jury
trial before a constitutionally appointed Article III judge, the party
is not required to receive such a jury trial.25 Therefore, as long as
the parties consent, a non-Article III court can conduct the trial.2 6
U.S. territories and the District of Columbia and courts-martial proceedings. In re
Clay, 35 F.3d at 192 (citing Marathon, 458 U.S. at 64-65; Palmore v. United
States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857);
American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828)). These three
exceptions are supported because Congress could have provided for less than a
trial by jury under these limited circumstances such as by resolution in legislative
courts or administrative agencies so that a non-Article III judge conducting a jury
trial does not take away or diminish a constitutional right. In re Clay, 35 F.3d
at 192.
21. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 71 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). This statement
from Marathon regarding core proceedings, however, was gratuitous as the issue
in Marathon, an action brought by the debtor-in-possession for breach of contract,
was found to be non-core. Id. The Court stated, -IT]he restructuring of debtor-
creditor relations, which is at the core of the federal bankruptcy power, must be
determined from the adjuictiontn o~f state-creatd private rights, such qas thi- right
to recover contract damages .... The former may well be a 'public right,' but
the latter obviously is not." Id.
22. This question is answered by analyzing whether the litigant would have such
a right as an action at law in Eighteenth century England. Granfinanciera, 492
U.S. at 42-44, 47.
23. In re Clay, 35 F.3d at 194-95.
24. Id. The court noted that:
The trustee [who was arguing that jury trials should be allowed in the
bankruptcy court] would trumpet efficiency, but we hear a kazoo, at best.
Reports of strategic manipulation of jury trials have been greatly exag-
gerated. In practice, litigants have not begun demanding more jury trials
since 1989, when Granfinanciera established a right to jury trial in certain
bankruptcy proceedings.
Id.
25. Id. at 196. The court noted that the party can settle and forego any jury
if it chooses to do so. Id.
26. Id.
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By enacting Section 112 of the Act, Congress clarified that
parties may be deprived of their Seventh Amendment right to a jury
trial before an Article III judge only by consenting to a trial before
a bankruptcy court that has been authorized by the district court
to conduct jury trials.
IV. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is identified with the phrase
"the king can do no wrong," a phrase coined by Blackstone. 27 This
idea rests on two premises: (1) the theory of the divine right of
monarchs and (2) the realities of the structure of the feudal system. 28
Ironically, the history of sovereign immunity in America was
influenced greatly by the fear of states going bankrupt. In Chisholm
v. Georgia,29 two South Carolinians filed suit against Georgia to
collect on state bonds. The Court found that Article III of the
Constitution did not grant a state immunity from suit in federal
court.30 The states quickly realized that this ruling would give citizens
of other states a forum to require them to pay bonds issued during
the American Revolution.31 The Eleventh Amendment to the
Constitution3 2 was ratified in order to prevent this result. Chisholm
v. Georgia was also an opportunity for the Court to discuss the
immunity of the United States. Chief Justice Jay pointed out that
although the executive branch of the federal government could execute
decisions adverse to the states and citizens, no authority could execute
against the federal government. 3
Over the years, Congress has passed laws waiving immunity in
many instances where appropriate; however, the Supreme Court has
always found that such waiver must be "unequivocally expressed." ' ,
27. ERLICH, ERLICH'S BLACKSTONE 67 (1959).
28. 12 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 300.0311] (2d.
ed. 1993).
29. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
30. Id.
31. 1 WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (rev. ed. 1926).
32. The Eleventh Amendment provides:
The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects
of any foreign state.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
33. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
34. Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990). For
example, the Chandler Act of 1938 and the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 contained no
UALR LAW JOURNAL
When the Bankruptcy Code was initially drafted, the issue of
sovereign immunity was a foreign concept. The original commission
report 5 proposed a section of a new bankruptcy law to deal with
sovereign immunity. The proposed provision stated:
Section 1-104. Applicability of Act to United States, states and
subdivisions. All provisions of the Act shall apply to the United
States and to every department, agency, and instrumentality thereof,
and to every state and every subdivision thereof except where
otherwise specifically provided. This section does not render any
branch or unit of the government eligible for relief as a petitioner
except as provided in Chapter VIII [public agencies and subdi-
visions], or subject to relief as a debtor upon an involuntary
petition .36
Adoption of this straightforward provision undoubtedly would
have been seen as a clear and "unequivocal expression" of the intent
of the United States to waive sovereign immunity for itself and to
waive any state and local government immunity that may have
existed. The note added to this section provided quite simply:
This section, with the exceptions indicated, answers the question
whether all of the provisions of this act are intended to apply
to federal and state governments and to all subdivisions and
instrumentalities thereof.3 7
For whatever reason, Congress decided not to adopt this simple
provision. Instead, Congress adopted what ultimately became Section
106 of the Bankruptcy Code, which is, as the Supreme Court ul-
timately told us, less than an unequivocal expression of the waiver
of sovereign immunity.18 The Court was first faced with the question
of whether the Code authorized a monetary recovery against a state
agency in Hoffman v. Connecticut Department of Income Main-
reference to sovereign immunity, and therefore, the courts found no waiver. See
McAvoy v. United States, 178 F.2d 353, 356 (2d Cir 1949); In re American Boiler
Works, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 352, 354 (W.D. Pa. 1954), aff'd, 220 F.2d 319 (3d
Cir. 1955).
35. S.J. Res. 88, 91st Cong., 2d. Sess. (1970) (creating the Commission on the
Bankruptcy Laws of the United States).
36. H.R. REP. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1 & 2, at 10 (1973).
37. Id.
38. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985). The Court
stated that, "Congress may abrogate the states' constitutionally secured immunity
from suit in federal court only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the
language of the statute. The fundamental nature of the interests implicated by the
Eleventh Amendment dictates this conclusion." Id.
[Vol. 17:387
19951 THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1995 395
tenance.39 In a plurality opinion, the Court declared that although
Sections 106(a) and 106(b) were clear, Section 106(c) was not.40
Because Section 106(c) was the only section under which a trustee
could recover in the case, the trustee lost. Justice White wrote:
"[T]he narrow scope of the waivers of sovereign immunity in
Sections 106(a) and (b) makes it unlikely that Congress adopted in
Section 106(c) [a] broad abrogation of Eleventh Amendment im-
munity." '41 Justice Scalia found that Congress could not override a
state's Eleventh Amendment right not to be sued for a money
judgment using the Constitution's bankruptcy clause. 42 In a dissent,
Justice Marshall wrote: "[Tihe language of [the Code] satisfies even
the requirement that Congress' intent to abrogate the States' Eleventh
Amendment immunity be 'unmistakably clear."
'' 43
Several years later, the Court revisited this issue, this time in
a suit against a federal agency." In In re Nordic Village, Inc., the
trustee in a Chapter 11 proceeding sued the IRS to recover funds
a corporate executive embezzled in order to pay his personal taxes.
45
The Bankruptcy Court allowed recovery, and the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.46 Justice Scalia, speaking
for a seven member majority of the Supreme Court, pointed out
that Sections 106(a) and (b) were "unequivocal expressions" of the
intent to waive sovereign immunity in two settings: (1) where the
governmental unit had filed a claim, and the trustee filed a com-
pulsory counterclaim, and (2) where the trustee claimed a set-off
using a permissive counterclaim. 47 The Court called Sections 106(a)
and 106(b) "models of clarity." ' 48 Justice Scalia agreed that while
Section 106(c) waived sovereign immunity in some instances, it failed
to establish unambiguously that the waiver extended to monetary
claims against the entity, when no governmental claim was involved. 49
Section 106 as amended by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994
provides a convoluted recitation of sections 0 to which the purported
39. 492 U.S. 96 (1989).
40. Id. at 101 (White, J., plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 105 (Scalia, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 106 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
44. United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992).
45. In re Nordic Village, Inc., 915 F.2d 1049 (6th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 503 U.S.
30 (1992).
46. Id.
47. United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Amended section 106(a)(1) provides:
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waiver would apply and a restatement of the previous language.
Previous Section 106(a) became Section 106(b) with a slight change.
The earlier 106(a) provided that sovereign immunity was waived as
to any claim against the governmental unit under certain conditions.
The amended 106(b) provides that the governmental unit "that has
filed a proof of claim in the case" is deemed to have waived immunity
under the same conditions. The new Section 106(b) is even less of
a waiver than the old Section 106(b). In the old subsection, the
governmental unit waived immunity if there was a claim against the
unit which was property of the estate and which arose out of the
same transaction or occurrence as the unit's claim. The immunity
was waived even in the absence of a proof of claim being filed. In
the new subsection, if the governmental unit must file a proof of
claim, immunity is not waived, at least not by that subsection.
Congress added a few introductory words to new Section 106(c),
but the new subsection continues to require the governmental unit's
claim be allowed before allowing an offset of a claim against the
estate.
The real change in Section 106 occurred in old subsection 106(c)
which was deleted, and new subsection 106(a) which was completely
re-written. The drafters of new subsection 106(a) apparently incor-
porated the language of Hoffman v. Connecticut Department of
Income MaintenanceI because the subsection now provides for the
"abrogation" of sovereign immunity.5 2 However, the new subsection
lists by section numbers the extent to which the immunity is ab-
rogated. It would seem to have been more appropriate for Congress
to adopt the proposal of the National Bankruptcy Conference which
simply provided that "all provisions of this title apply to govern-
mental units." 53
(a) Notwithstanding an assertion of sovereign immunity, sovereign immunity
is abrogated as to a governmental unit to the extent set forth in this
section with respect to the following:
(1) Sections 105, 106, 107, 108, 303, 346, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 502,
503, 505, 506, 510, 522, 523, 524, 525, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548,
549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 722, 724, 726, 728, 744, 749, 764, 901, 922, 926,
928, 929, 944, 1107, 1141, 1142, 1143, 1146, 1201, 1203, 1205, 1206, 1227,
1231, 1301, 1303, 1305, and 1327 of this title.
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 113, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(108 Stat.) 4106, 4117 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 106(a)(l)).
51. Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't. of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96 (1989).
52. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 113, 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 4106, 4117 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 106).
53. THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE, CODE REVIEW PROJECT FINAL
REPORT 66 (1994). Subsection 106(a)(3) clearly provides that a court may issue a
[Vol. 17:387
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V. INSIDER PREFERENCES
Section 202 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 addressed
problems created in interpreting the Bankruptcy Code originally
adopted in 1979 concerning insider preferences. Shortly after the
adoption of the Bankruptcy Code of 1979, a theory was advanced
that the Code had dramatically changed the law of insider prefer-
ences. Clearly, there were radical changes, but the changes turned
out to be even more radical than intended by the drafters of the
Code.
Under pre-Bankruptcy Code Law, a "preference" was a transfer
to a creditor made under certain conditions and within four months
before the petition.14 No different time limits were in place for
transfers to insiders. The Commission draft of the new Bankruptcy
Code proposed in 1973 reduced the time limit to three months, but
it eliminated the requirement that the preferred creditor have any
reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent, as was
previously required." In addition to the three month time limit, the
Commission proposed a one year time limit if the transfers were to
"insiders" under the Code; however, it still required that the insider
have reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent at
the time of the transfer.16 The Commission placed the burden of
proof of insolvency and reasonable cause on the trustee. This was
the first time a piroposal was made suggesting that insider creditors
be treated differently than non-insider creditors.
The Bankruptcy Code, when ultimately adopted in 1979, ex-
tended the insider concept beyond what the Commission had pro-
posed.17 Although the Code retained the three month (actually 90
days) rule for transfers to non-insider creditors and the one year
rule for transfers to insider creditors, it deleted any requirement
that either creditor have reasonable cause to believe the debtor was
insolvent at the time of the transfer.
Even though many changes were made to the concept of pre-
ferences with the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1979, it was
argued that Congress did not intend to allow recovery from non-
insiders beyond the 90 day time limit. In Arkansas, this issue was
first considered in the case of Mixon v. Mid-Continent Systems,
money recovery. Id. No recovery, however, is available for punitive damages. Id.
This subsection provides that judgments may include costs and attorneys' fees
consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(a).
54. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 60.02-60.35 (James W. Moore et al. eds.,
14th ed. 1977).
55. H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93d. Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
56. Id.
57. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1988).
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Inc.,8 and became known as a "Big Three Preference Action." 5 9
The issue later became more widely known as a "Deprezio Pref-
erence. "60
An insider preference occurs when an insolvent debtor transfers
property to a non-insider creditor, such as a money-lender, between
90 days and one year before filing bankruptcy, and the transfer
benefits an insider who guaranteed the debtor's obligation. At first
blush, it would appear that the transfer to a non-insider outside the
90 day time limit cannot be recovered by the trustee because Section
547(b)(4)(B) allows the recovery of a transfer within the one year
period only "if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an
insider. ' 61 According to Section 547, a trustee may recover a transfer
made for the benefit of a creditor between 90 days and one year
prior to the petition if such creditor was an insider at the time of
the transfer. 62 Notice that the transfer need not have been made to
the creditor, but only for the benefit of the creditor.63 A guarantor
of a debtor is also a creditor holding a contingent claim. 64 If the
primary debt is not paid, then the insider/guarantor must pay and
is subrogated to the claim of the creditor. The Section 101(5) def-
inition of claim is so broad that it undoubtedly includes the rights
of the insider/guarantor in this situation. The transaction described
above meets the requirement of the Code that the transfer be to
or for the benefit of a creditor, because it reduced the insider's
contingent liability to the non-insider money-lender.
According to Bankruptcy Code Section 550, after establishing
that a transfer is avoided, a trustee may recover the transfer from
the initial transferee - in our case, the money-lender. 6 The pre-
1994 Code did not contain a restriction on the trustee's right to
collect the transfer from the benefitted insider creditor, regardless
of the fact that the trustee was able to set aside a transfer which
occurred mnr than 90V, o, days b,,ue.r the p, c"L oly beausc t.,
benefitted creditor was an insider.
58. 41 B.R. 16 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1983).
59. This phrase was derived from the name of the debtor, Big Three Trans-
portation, Inc., in Mixon v. Mid-Continent Sys., Inc., 41 B.R. 16 (Bankr. W.D.
Ark. 1983).
60. This phrase was derived from the name of the debtor in Levit v. Ingersoll
Rand Fin. Corp., 847 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989).
61. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1988).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (Supp. V 1993). Section 101(5) defines claim as
including a "contingent" right to payment. Id.
65. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (1988).
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Many bankruptcy courts considering facts similar to those above
declined to allow recovery from the non-insider creditor. 66 All of
the circuit courts which have considered the issue agreed with De-
prezio and allowed recovery from the non-insider creditor.
67
Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code prevented trustees from pur-
suing the insider creditor rather than the non-insider creditor. How-
ever, because an insider of a bankrupt company often has more
shallow pockets than a bank or other money-lender, the money-
lenders became the obvious target of these types of preference actions.
Many courts and commentators felt that allowing recovery from the
non-insider beyond the 90 day limit was unfair and inequitable. 68
Allowing recovery from the non-insider creditor also led to results
that lacked practical commercial sense. For example, a diligent,
conscientious lender which had the foresight to secure a guarantor
for a loan would be in worse shape than a lender which did not
obtain a guarantor.
The National Bankruptcy Conference recommended changing
the Code back to the pre-Code law which allowed a trustee to bring
actions only against those as to whom a transfer was preferential.
69
Congress made the change with Section 202 of the Act by amending
Section 550 of the Code. 70 The new Section 550(c) simply provides
that transfers made between 90 days and one year before filing the
petition, which are avoided under Section 547(b), may not be re-
covered from one class of creditors.
7
1
In order for a transferee to escape liability and take advantage
of the amendment, the transferee must meet three requirements
imposed by the Act.72 The first requirement is that the transfer must
have been made between 90 days and one year before the filing of
66. See Official Creditors' Comm. of Arundel Hous. Components, Inc. v.
Georgia-Pacific Corp. (In re Arundel Hous. Components, Inc.), 126 B.R. 216, 219
(Bankr. D. Md. 1991); Block v. Texas Commerce Bank Nat'l Assn. (In re Midwestern
Cos., Inc.), 102 B.R. 169, 173 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989).
67. See Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co., 899 F.2d 1490, 1495 (6th Cir. 1990);
Manufacturers Hanover Leasing Corp. v. Lowrey, 892 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1989);
Kellogg v. Blue Quail Energy, Inc., 831 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1987). See generally 4
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 550.02 (Lawrence P. King et al., eds., 15th ed. 1994).
68. See 1 DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY § 6-10 n.15 (1992).
69. TiE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE, CODE REVIEW PROJECT FINAL
REPORT 228 (1994).
70. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 202, 1994




the petition.7 The second requirement is that the transfer must have
been avoided under Section 547(b). 74 Even though Section 550 applies
to recoveries using other avoiding powers under Sections 544, 548,
and 549, this new narrow limitation applies only to recoveries under
Section 547."1
The third requirement is that the preference must be made "for
the benefit of a creditor" who was an insider at the time of such
transfer. 76 One might ask why the phrase "for the benefit" was
used. Section 547(b) allows for recoveries of transfers either to or
for the benefit of a creditor; the amendment, by contrast, only
mentions transfers "for the benefit of a creditor" and omits the
language that would limit transfers directly to an insider. 77 Read
literally in conjunction with Section 547(b), the third requirement of
the now amended Section 550(c) would limit recoveries only if the
transfer were "for the benefit of a creditor."
One might also ask why it is significant that only non-insider
creditors are being protected with this amendment when all such
transfers would have been for the benefit of an insider creditor.
The answer is found in the concluding clause of the amendment to
Section 550 where there may be an unfortunate shift in tenses. We
say "unfortunate" since it is impossible to tell from reading the
amendment whether it was intended. If it was intended, it is not
merely unfortunate; it is nonsensical. The language of Section 202
of the Act provides that "the trustee may not recover ... from a
transferee that is not an insider."
' 78
This concluding phrase can be interpreted to mean that if a
former insider creditor benefitted from a preference at the time she
was an insider, but is no longer an insider at the time the trustee
files the preferential transfer action, then the trustee cannot recover
from the former insider. Does this mean, for instance, that in a
Chapter 7 proceeding, the previous officers of the debtor who are
no longer insiders after the trustee is appointed are exempt from
the provisions regarding insider preferences? There is nothing in the
73. Id.
74. Id. Section 547(b) provides the requirements necessary to avoid a preferential
transfer. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988).
75. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 202, 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 4106, 4121 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 550).
76. Id.
77. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988).
78. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 202, 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 4106, 4121 (codified at II U.S.C. § 550).
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legislative history regarding the drafters' intent; therefore, only ju-
dicial interpretation will answer these questions.
The implication of this amendment to insiders is important.
While the money-lenders are now protected, insiders also receive
benefits from the amendments. An insider may now cause a pref-
erential transfer to be made to a creditor outside the 90 days before
filing and know that the benefit derived from the transfer to the
non-insider creditor cannot be set aside. The contingent creditor of
the insider is now protected from the reach of Section 547 by
Section 202 of the Act.
Trustees will always look for deep pockets, just as any plaintiff
does. With the deep pockets of the money-lenders extinguished by
Section 202 of the Act, the trustee may be less inclined to pursue
the insider with the requisite expenditure of time, effort and attor-
neys' fees, especially where collection of any judgment is less likely.
Presumably, preference actions should become less plentiful for trus-
tees, and creditors of estates in bankruptcy will suffer.
For the insider, the ability to negotiate with the trustee is
enhanced if the insider is able to convince the trustee of the difficulty
of collection. With the right type of planning, an insider would be
able to reduce the debt secured by a potentially exempt asset owned
by the insider (such as a mortgage on the insider creditor's home)
by paying with corporate funds the creditor of the corporation who
holds a guarantee secured by that potentially exempt asset to the
detriment of the other creditors. This type of situation could not
have occurred to the detriment of the corporate debtor's creditors
without the amendments found in Section 202 of the Act.
VI. LIEN STRIPPING IN CHAPTER 11
Section 206 of the Act amends Section 1123(b) to afford lenders
with security interests only in a debtor's principal residence the same
protection as lenders under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.79
The new Section 1123(b) provides:
(b) Subject to subsection (a) of this section, a plan may-
(5) modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than
a claim secured only by a security interest in real property that
is the debtor's principal residence, or of holders of unsecured
79. The legislative history indicates that this amendment was intended to conform
Chapter 11 mortgagee treatment with that allowed under Chapter 13. 140 CONG.
REC. 10,767 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994).
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claims, or leave unaffected the rights of holders of any class of
claims.80
By making the language of Section 1123(b)(5) identical to Section
1322(b)(2), 81 Congress has extended the principle of Nobleman v.
American Savings Bank 2 to Chapter 11 cases.
In Nobleman, the Court considered whether Section 1322(b)(2)
of the Bankruptcy Code should be read in conjunction with and
limited by Section 506(a) which defines a creditor's secured claim
rights. 83 The Court rejected the argument that Section 506(a) must
first be applied to determine the value of the secured claim for
purposes of non-disturbance under Section 1322(b)(2). The Supreme
Court noted that the express language of Section 1322(b)(2) provides
that the "rights" of primary residence lenders cannot be affected.
84
Noting that the term "rights" is not defined by the Bankruptcy
Code, the Supreme Court utilized the state law definition of creditor's
rights.85 The Court stated that a secured creditor should not be
limited to its allowed secured claim under Section 506(a) for purposes
of non-disturbance under Section 1322(b)(2). 86 Therefore, the Court
concluded that a creditor may retain all its rights as to this type
of security under Section 1322(b)(2), including the right to receive
payment for the entire debt.1
7
80. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 206, 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 4106, 4123 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1123).
81. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) provides that:
(b) Subject to subsections (a) and (c) of this section, the plan may-
(2) modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim
secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's
principal residence, or of holders of unsecured claims, or leave unaffected
the rights of holders of any class of claims;. ...
11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988).
82. 113 S. Ct. 2106 (1993).
83. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) provides:
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which
the estate has an interest . . . is a secured claim to the extent of the value
of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property . . . and
is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest
... is less than the amount of such allowed claim. Such value shall be
determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed
disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction with any hearing
on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor's interest.
11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).




87. Id. Interestingly, even outside the context of a mortgagee with a security
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The Court next noted that a mortgagee whose security is only
in the debtor's principal residence can point to the use of the word
''claim" in the governing statute as encompassing both secured and
unsecured debts." The section protects the debtor's enforceable mort-
gage provisions as a claim without qualifying it as solely a secured
claim. Consequently, it is inappropriate to reduce a mortgagee's
rights by pointing to Section 506(a).19 Ironically, the debtor is not
allowed to alter a secured creditor's right to payment on perhaps
her most important asset, her residence. 90
interest only in a debtor's primary residence, the Supreme Court has not allowed
the lien avoidance language of Section 506(d) to be read in conjunction with
Section 506(a) to allow an undersecured creditor's lien rights to be stripped to the
allowed secured claim value as determined by Section 506(a). As one commentator
said:
Even though the term "allowed secured claim" might arguably have the
same meaning for purposes of section 506(d) that it does for section 506(a),
the Court held that Congress did not intend to depart from the pre-
Bankruptcy Code rule that liens pass through the case unaffected. Thus,
section 506(d) can be used to avoid a lien only if the underlying claim is
disallowed, not if a portion of the claim is deemed unsecured by operation
of section 506(a).
3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 506.07 (Lawrence P. King et al., eds., 15th ed. 1994)
(citing Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992)). The Court stated that it has long
been the rule that the lien rights of a creditor are unaffected solely because of a
bankruptcy. Of course, the lien can be disallowed if the claim is avoided, which
is the remaining right under Section 506(d). The secured creditor retains its lien
rights and benefits from any subsequent appreciation in the asset to the date of
foreclosure of its lien interests. Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 (1992). While
this creditor for purposes of Section 506(a) will have its claim bifurcated and,
therefore, will receive an unsecured claim for the undersecured portion of its claim;
presumably, if the undersecured claim portion results in an additional return to
the creditor, then this creditor will not be allowed to obtain more than its allowed
indebtedness under its governing documents.
The Court has noted that it is impossible to reduce a mortgagee's claim and
not affect its rights because contractual rights are contained in one document in
which the payment terms are not bifurcated by secured versus unsecured. Nobleman,
113 S. Ct. at 2111. One court noted that at oral argument in Nobleman, "counsel
was unable to give the questioning Justice 'an example of how one can modify
the rights pertaining to this unitary instrument only as to the unsecured portion,
but not as to the secured portion."' Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. v. Hirsch (In re
Hirsch), 166 B.R. 248, 252 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
88. Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2111.
89. Id. The Court explained:
It is also plausible, therefore, to read "a claim secured only by a [homestead
lien]" as referring to the lienholder's entire claim, including both the
secured claim and the unsecured components of the claim. Indeed, § 506(a)
itself uses the phrase "claim ... secured by a lien" to encompass both
portions of an undersecured claim.
Id.
90. Id. at 2112 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens suggested that "[tihe
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Under Section 1123(b), the question of what constitutes "a claim
secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's
principal residence" opens the door for courts to review individual
mortgages on a case-by-case basis. In Nobleman, the deed of trust
granted rights in addition to a lien on the primary residential in-
terest. 9'
VII. PosT PETITION RENTS
The Constitution of the United States empowered Congress "[tlo
establish . .. uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies through-
anomaly is, however, explained by the legislative history indicating that favorable
treatment of residential mortgagees was intended to encourage the flow of capital
into the home lending market." Id.
91. Included in the grant under the Nobleman deed of trust was a percentage
interest in the common areas of the primary residence condominium unit as well
as a pledge of:
[A]lI the improvements now or hereafter erected on the property, and all
easements, rights, appurtenances, rents, . . . royalties, mineral, oil and gas
rights and profits, water, water rights, and water stock, and all fixtures
now or hereafter attached to the property, all of which, including re-
placements and additions thereto, shall be deemed to be and remain a
part of the property covered by this Deed of Trust.
In re Hirsch, 166 B.R. at 252. The Hirsch court notes that where a creditor's
interest goes beyond the standard real estate pledge, such as set out in the Nobleman
Deed of Trust, that such additional security would result in the creditor not receiving
the protections of Section 1322(b)(2). The Hirsch court gives a colorful example
assuming that the debtor was Citizen Kane and that the mortgage covers not only
all of Xanadu's real estate and fixtures but also significant furniture and equipment,
including:
[Glriffins, gargoyles and goblets. . . . The legislative history of § 1322(b)(2)
records that Congress wished to give extra protection to home mortgage
lenders in order to encourage such common financings, Grubbs v. Houston
First American Sav. Assoc., 730 F.2d 236, 246 (5th Cir. 1984), and adding
Citizen Kane's horde to Xanadu would give his lender more than Congress
believed necessary.
In re Hirsch, 166 B.R. at 254.
The Hirsch court indicates that the debtor's ability to scale back its creditor's
rights will in some measure depend on the ability of the creditor to show that the
lender's interests were secured by property other than the real estate and boiler
plate real estate interests. Id. Such was the case in In re Ramirez where the real
property provided almost half of the debtor's income from two rental units located
on it. In re Ramirez, 62 B.R. 668 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1986). Noting that the lender
would only qualify the debtor for the loan based on this rental income, the Ramirez
court found that the secured party's security interest extended to more than the
debtor's principal residence, and also included its commercial rental features, and
thus allowed the debtor to alter the creditor's rights pursuant to its Chapter 13
plan. Id. at 670.
However, other cases that have held that the use of the debtor is primarily
residential even though there are other actual or potential uses. See, e.g., In re
Glenn, 760 F.2d 1428 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 849 (1985); In re
Ballard, 4 B.R. 271 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980).
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out the United States." 92 Although bankruptcy law was uniformly
established under "the Bankruptcy Code," 93 the application has been
inconsistent due to differences in judicial interpretation of the Bank-
ruptcy Code and variances in state laws defining property rights.
94
92. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
93. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
94. Except in the areas of fraudulent conveyances and preferences, property
rights are largely defined by state law. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54
(1979). In addition, the uniform interpretation of property rights in state and federal
courts within the same state has been cited as a proper goal. Such uniformity
"reduce[s] uncertainty, . . . discourage[s] forum shopping, and ... prevent[s] a
party from receiving 'a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of bank-
ruptcy."' Butner, 440 U.S. at 55 (quoting Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 364
U.S. 603, 609 (1961)). Especially with national companies or companies with
subsidiaries operating in several states, a focus solely on uniform interpretations
within a state neglects the federal forum shopping that can otherwise result.
Code areas that are subject to state law variances include, but are not limited
to, 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (allowing a trustee to avoid a transfer of property of the
debtor as if a hypothetical lien creditor or hypothetical bona fide transferee under
state law); and 11 U.S.C. § 546(b) (allowing a creditor to perfect an interest in
property notwithstanding a bankruptcy stay, where the filing is deemed to relate
back to a time period before the bankruptcy filing).
Another example is found under Bankruptcy Code § 546(a). Here, the exercise
of the trustee's avoiding powers are limited in time to the earlier of "two years
after the appointment of a trustee under section 702, 1104, 1163, 1302 or 1202
[of Title XI]; or the time the case is closed or dismissed." 11 U.S.C. § 546(a)(1988).
Before the Act, § 546(a)(1) was subject to varying interpretations. Some courts
applied the two year limit to a debtor in possession who exercised the powers of
a trustee. Zilkha Energy Co. v. Leighton, 920 F.2d 1520, 1524 (10th Cir. 1990).
Accord Construction Management Serv. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 13
F.3d 81 (3d Cir. 1994); In re Software Center Int'l, Inc., 994 F.2d 682 (9th Cir.
1993).
A recent bankruptcy court decision held to the contrary, stating that the two
year limitation period only expressly applies to a bankruptcy trustee. In re Electrical
Materials, 160 B.R. 1018, 1022 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1993). This case held that
§ 546(a) does not require an action to be brought within two (2) years after the
debtor in possession comes into existence, but only before the case is closed or
dismissed. Id. This difference in interpretations was resolved by § 216 of the Act,
which amended § 546(a) to read as follows:
(a) An action or proceeding under section 544, 545, 547, 548, or 553 of
this title may not be commenced after the earlier of -
(1) the later of -
(A) 2 years after the entry of the order for relief; or
(B) 1 year after the appointment or election of the first trustee under
section 702, 1104, 1163, 1202, or 1302 of this title if such appointment
or such election occurs before the expiration of the periods specified in
subparagraph (A); or
(2) the time the case is closed or dismissed.
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 216, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(108 Stat.) 4106, 4126-27 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 546).
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In passing the Act, Congress addressed state law differences
regarding creditors' rights in a debtor's post-petition rents. 95 Section
214 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act amends Bankruptcy Code
Section 552(b) as follows:
(b)(1) Except as provided in sections 363, 506(c), 522, 544, 545,
547, and 548 of this title, if the debtor and an entity entered
into a security agreement before the commencement of the case
and if the security interest created by such security agreement
extends to property of the debtor acquired before the com-
mencement of the case and to proceeds, product, offspring, or
profits of such property, then such security interest extends to
such proceeds, product, offspring, or profits acquired by the
estate after the commencement of the case to the extent provided
by such security agreement and by applicable nonbankruptcy law,
except to any extent that the court, after notice and a hearing
and based on the equities of the case, orders otherwise.
(2) Except as provided in sections 363, 506(c), 522, 544, 545,
547, and 548 of this title, and notwithstanding section 546(b) of
this title, if the debtor and an entity entered into a security
agreement before the commencement of the case and if the security
interest created by such security agreement extends to property
of the debtor acquired before the commencement of the case and
to amounts paid as rents of such property or the fees, charges,
accounts, or other payments for the use or occupancy of rooms
and other public facilities in hotels, motels, or other lodging
properties, then such security interest extends to such rents and
such fees, charges, accounts, or other payments acquired by the
estate after the commencement of the case to the extent provided
in such security agreement, except to any extent that the court,
after notice and a hearing and based on the equities of the case,
orders otherwise. 96
Even pre-amendment Section 552(b) did not specifically address
perfection issues. The pre-amendment provision regarding the re-
quirement that "applicable non-bankruptcy law" be consulted before
concluding that the security interest continues in rents often resulted
in courts reviewing state law to determine when a security interest
in rents became perfected.
97
95. Butner, 440 U.S. at 54. The Court acknowledged that such a Congressional
rule regarding rents would be within Congress' express power. Id.
96. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 214, 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 4106, 4126 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 552).
97. See, e.g., Butner, 440 U.S. at 55; First Fed. Sav. v. City Nat'l Bank, 87
B.R. 565, 566 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1988); In re Multi-Group III Ltd. Partnership,
99 B.R. 5 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1989).
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Case law interpreting Section 552(b) created a patchwork of
state law-specific results. 98 Some courts allowed an admittedly un-
perfected post-petition interest to become perfected and relate back
based on post-petition actions under Section 546(b). 99 Many courts
criticized the use of Section 546(b) as a vehicle for allowing post-
petition perfection in rents.00
98. See, e.g., In re Wheaton Oaks Office Partners Ltd. Partnership, 27 F.3d
1234, 1245 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding that an executed and recorded assignment of
rents created a perfected lien on future rents and that no steps for collection were
necessary to protect the interest); In re Multi-Group III Ltd. Partnership, 99 B.R.
5 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1989) (holding that under Arizona's lien theory of mortgages
and statutory framework, mortgagee was not entitled to rents until specific, af-
firmative actions were taken).
99. Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4), the filing of a petition under Code §§ 301-
303 stays "any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the
estate." 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4)(1988).
Section 362(b)(3) provides a limited exception to the stay "to the extent that
the trustee's rights and powers are subject to such perfection under section 546(b)
of this title." 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(3)(1988).
Under § 546(b), the trustee's rights to set aside an unperfected lien interest
under its strong arm provisions (11 U.S.C. § 544) are subject to any generally
applicable law that:
permits perfection of an interest in property to be effective against an
entity that acquires rights in such property before the date of such per-
fection. If such law requires seizure of such property or commencement
of an action to accomplish such perfection, and such property has not
been seized or such action has not been commenced before the date of
the filing of the petition, such interest in such property shall be perfected
by notice within the time fixed by such law for such seizure or com-
mencement.
11 U.S.C. § 546(b) (1988).
A Texas case provides a good example of the variances in analysis used by
courts in reviewing the post-petition perfection issue. Under Texas law, affirmative
steps must be taken to effectuate an assignment of rents. In re Casbeer, 793 F.2d
1436, 1442 (5th Cir. 1986). Although certain actions are admittedly sufficient, such
as obtaining a receiver or obtaining possession of the property, Texas courts could
review on a case by case basis the sufficiency of the particular steps taken. In re
Village Properties, Ltd., 723 F.2d 441, 446 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 466 U.S.
974 (1984). The mortgagee in Casbeer filed a motion for relief from stay, a motion
to prevent use of rents, and a complaint for injunctive relief. Casbeer, 793 F.2d
at 1438. Noting that the subject mortgage provisions prevented additional encum-
brances, and that such contract provisions are important in reviewing lien priorities,
the Casbeer court found that the creditor's post-petition actions were sufficient to
cause its perfection to relate back. Id. at 1443.
100. See, e.g., In re Multi-Group III Ltd. Partnership, 99 B.R. 5, 9 (Bankr.
D. Ariz. 1989). Legislative history shows that the intent of Bankruptcy Code § 546(b)
was to protect the creditor who is otherwise allowed to create an interest that
relates back, such as under Section 9-301(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Just as a creditor does not get credit for the "use value" of its pledged property,
other than post-petition interest if the creditor is over secured, the unperfected,
unsecured creditor should not receive overly favorable treatment. Multi-Group III
Ltd., 99 B.R. at 11.
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Under Arkansas law, the question of whether an interest in
rents is perfected depends on whether the rents are pledged and
whether the assignment is absolute or conditional.' 0 Other courts
specifically reject the distinction between absolute or conditional
assignments. 102
According to legislative history, the amendment purportedly
removes the pre-condition of a perfected security interest under state
law in order to claim an interest in post-petition rents.103 By amending
Section 552(b), however, Congress either sidestepped or confused the
question of whether a creditor must have a perfected interest in
post-petition rents under non-bankruptcy state law, thus preventing
strong arm challenges under Section 544 solely because a properly
perfected post-petition security interest is alleged not to exist.
To fully understand the effect of this amendment, consider the
following hypothetical. A lender ("Lender") takes a mortgage on
an Arkansas office building ("Building") which does not include
any mention of rents. The owner of the Building then gives Lender
a letter granting an interest in the rents, which Lender does not file
of record. The mortgage is duly recorded as required by state law.
The owner of the Building then files a Chapter 11 proceeding. The
Debtor then proceeds to use post-petition rents as he sees fit. Lender
files a motion to prevent use of post-petition rents claiming a security
interest in the rents. Under the pre-Act Code, the Debtor would
have prevailed because Lender failed to file a record of his interest
in the rents.
After Section 214 of the Act, the Lender will argue that the
amended Section 552(b)(2) provides that it has a security interest in
the rents because it entered into a security agreement before the
commencement of the case and the agreement extends to rents. There
is nothing in amended Section 552(b)(2) that requires perfection of
that interest, The Lender will point to the legislative history which
provides that the intent of the amendment is to avoid the requirements
of "non-bankruptcy" law. The Debtor will point out that
101. First Fed. Say. v. City Nat'l Bank, 87 B.R. 565, 567 (Bankr. W.D. Ark.
1988). Under Arkansas law, rents are a separate interest in realty and may be
conveyed or pledged in addition to a pledge solely of the realty. Id. (citing ARK.
CODE ANN. § 18-12-102 (Michie 1987)).
102. See Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Metro Square (In re Metro Square),
93 B.R. 990 (Bankr. Minn. 1988). The court found that conflicting language in
the documents supported an absolute as well as unconditional assignment arguments.
Id. In addition, the court held that rents were collaterally assigned as additional
security. Id. at 996.
103. 140 CONG. REC. 10,768 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994).
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Section 552(b)(1) begins by saying "Except as provided in section[]
... 544." Therefore, the court must look only to Section 544 to
determine if it should cut off the Lender's rights. The Debtor will
assert that any further reference to the amended Section 552(b)(1)
is unnecessary.
Unfortunately, the correct decision for the court is difficult to
determine because both the Lender and the Debtor are correct in
their arguments. Although the legislative history and comments clearly
support the Lender's argument, the Debtor appears to have the
better argument when looking at the plain language of the amend-
ments contained in Section 214 of the Act and Section 544 of the
Code. 104
Under the pre-Act Section 552(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, if
a creditor's interest in post-petition rents was deemed unperfected
on the date the petition was filed, the creditor's interest was subject
to defeat by a trustee or debtor in possession pursuant to Section
544.105 As noted, it is puzzling that Section 552(b), as amended, is
still subject to the avoiding powers of Section 544. Does this mean
that a trustee as a bona fide purchaser or hypothetical lien creditor
can avoid a pre-petition, unperfected interest in rents? If post-petition
rents are subject to Section 544, then Congress's clearly articulated
goals as outlined in the legislative history protecting creditors' in-
terests in unperfected post-petition rents may have been for naught.106
The amended Code Section 552(b) now clearly includes hotel
revenues or room rents in the context of property 'proceeds. This
change addresses the question of whether hotel revenues are accounts
104. See Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982) (noting
that "[tlhere is. . .no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than
the words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes").
105. This section gives the trustee the power to assert the status of a lien creditor
or bona fide creditor for value, which status may allow the trustee to defeat the
debtor's property transfer or obligations. 11 U.S.C. § 544 (1988).
106. Under Section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code, the analysis arguably returns
to an inquiry of whether under a particular state's law a hypothetical lien creditor
or hypothetical bona fide purchaser may defeat an unperfected security interest in
rents. Perhaps in this specific context, the courts will note that Section 544(a),
because of its specific reference to a debtor's property, cannot affect the proceeds,
which are estate property under Section 541(a)(6). This argument, which is made
in a bankruptcy treatise, is quickly shot down by this treatise because the interest
in proceeds "will fail upon the avoidance for any reason of the security interest
in the collateral that produced the proceeds." 2 DAVID EPSTEIN, ET AL., BANKRUPTCY
§ 6-78, n.3 (1992). In addition, under Section 547(e)(2), if rights to proceeds are
not perfected, then the transfer of the proceeds (if considered real property under
governing state law) will be deemed to occur immediately before the date of the
filing of the petition for preference purposes or ten days after the effective date
of the transfer, if later. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2) (1988).
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receivable and, therefore, property of the debtor's estate or are
"proceeds, . . . rents, or profits" under old Section 552(b). 07 If a
third-party creditor proves that it has an interest in rents, the pro-
visions of Section 363 require that the rents, as cash collateral, be
protected. 08 The protection afforded is typically that rents be used
to maintain the collateral. 1°9 Even when such an order of adequate
protection is not made under Section 363(a), courts have reached
similar results."l0
VIII. SMALL BUSINESS CASES
Section 217 of the Act begins with the creation of a sub-category
of Chapter 11 for "small businesses." The amendment defines a
"small business" as a person"' engaged in commercial or business
activities, with aggregate, noncontingent liquidated secured and un-
secured debts not exceeding $2,000,000.112 The amendment excludes
a person whose primary activity is the business of owning or operating
real property from "small business.""' 3
Neither "commercial" nor "business" activity is defined in the
Code or the Act. However, Section 1304 implies that if one incurs
trade credit in the production of income, then one is engaged in
business." 4 Therefore, an individual engaged in commercial or busi-
ness activity will be able to choose between Chapter 13 and Chapter
11, depending on the level of debt. However, a partnership or
107. See, e.g., T-H New Orleans Ltd. Partnership v. Financial Sec. Assurance,
Inc., 10 F.3d 1099 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1833 (1994); United
States v. PS Hotel Corp., 404 F. Supp. 1188 (E.D. Mo.), aff'd, 527 F.2d 500 (8th
Cir. 1975).
108. 11 U.S.C. § 552 (1988). See R. BROUDE, REORGANIZATIONS UNDER CHAPTER
11 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE § 5.01 (1986) (stating that rents cannot be cash
collateral unless a creditor's interest is upheld in same because § 363(a) requires a
third party interest).
109. R. BROUDE, REORGANIZATIONS UNDER CHAPTER 11 OF THE BANKRUPTCY
CODE § 5.01 (1986).
110. In re Metro Square, 93 B.R. 990, 1001 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988) (holding
that a debtor in possession has a fiduciary obligation to use rents to pay insurance,
taxes, maintenance, etc.). Accord, In re T.M. Carlton House Partners Ltd., 91
B.R. 349 (Bankr. E.D. Penn. 1988); In re Association Ctr. Ltd. Partnership, 87
B.R. 142 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1988).
111. Section 101 defines "person" as an individual, partnership, or corporation.
11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (1988).
112. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 217, 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 4106, 4127 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101(51C)).
113. Id.
114. Section 1304 states: "A debtor that is self-employed and incurs trade credit
in the production of income from such employment is engaged in business." 11
U.S.C. § 1304(a) (1988).
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corporation can never use Chapter 13 and would be relegated to
Chapter 11 depending upon its debt amounts and activities in the
real estate business. Given the increase in the Chapter 13 limits on
debt, an individual engaged in business will certainly want to look
closely at Chapter 13 before deciding which chapter to proceed
under. Individuals, under the new Act, may now file Chapter 13 if
their noncontingent, liquidated unsecured debts are less than $250,000,
and their noncontingent, liquidated secured debts are less than
$750,000.11I
After defining who may take advantage of the small business
amendments, Section 217 makes other changes to Chapter 11. The
first provision (217(b) of the Act) deals with the appointment of
creditors and equity security holders committees. The pre-Act law
compelled the United States Trustee to appoint a committee of
holders of unsecured claims."16 Now, a "party in interest" may
request the court to direct that the United States Trustee not appoint
a committee of unsecured creditors." 7 No guidance is given to the
court as to when it should or should not allow the United States
Trustee to avoid appointing a committee."
8
The committee of unsecured creditors might become more pop-
ular and thus more active as a result of the amendments in Section
110 of the Act."19 This provision amends Section 503(b)(3) to allow
for the actual and necessary expenses incurred by appointed com-
mittee members in the performance of their duties.1 20 The allowance
could encourage committee members to take a more active part in
committee activities.
Another change made by the small business amendments con-
cerns the exclusivity period. Under the pre-Act Section 1121, the
debtor, absent court modification, had an exclusive period of 120
days in which to file a plan of reorganization, and that exclusivity
continued for 180 days from the petition while the debtor sought
approval of the plan. 12' If the debtor elects to be treated as a small
business, Section 217 of the Act provides several changes in the
115. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 108(a), 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 4106, 4111 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 109(e)).
116. 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (1988).
117. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 217(b)(3), 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 4106, 4127 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(3)).
118. Presumably, existing case law on the necessity of committees will continue
to control. One such case is In re Shaffer-Gordon Assocs., Inc., 40 B.R. 956
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984).
119. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 110, 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 4106, 4113 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 550(b)(3)(F)).
120. Id.
121. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (1988).
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length of time for the confirmation process. First, the election by
the debtor shortens the exclusivity period from 120 days to 100 days
from the petition date. 22 Section 217 also establishes a deadline of
160 days in which any plan may be filed by any party in interest.
123
Therefore, by giving up 20 days of the otherwise applicable exclusivity
period, the debtor can impose on all parties an absolute 160 day
period for filing any competing plans. Section 217 also permits the
debtor and parties in interest to petition the court to reduce the
100-day period and the 160-day period when appropriate. 24 The 100-
day period may be increased, but only if the debtor shows that the
need for an increase is caused by circumstances for which the debtor
should not be held accountable.
125
Once the election is made under Section 217(e), the court may
conditionally approve a disclosure statement subject to final approval
after notice and hearing. 126 Section 217 also allows the court to
shorten the time, to not less than 10 days, between mailing a
conditionally approved disclosure statement and the hearing on con-
firmation of the plan. 127 Creditors may find themselves with a very
short period of time in which to react to a conditionally approved
disclosure statement and proposed plan of reorganization. After the
conditional approval of the disclosure statement by the court, the
debtor may mail the plan and disclosure statement to the creditors
and solicit approval of the plan based on the conditional approval
of the disclosure statement.
28
At least one other interesting question remains concerning Sec-
tion 217. Must a small business election be made for all purposes?
Based on the language of Section 217, arguably, an election could
be made for one purpose but not the other. Section 217(e) modifies
the section of the Code dealing with filing plans, and Section 217(f)
deals with disclosure statements, and neither mentions the other.
These issues will be determined by judicial interpretation.
IX. SINGLE ASSET CASES
Section 218 of the Act deals with single asset real estate cases
in bankruptcy.129 A "single asset" real estate case is where the
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. § 217(d).
125. Id. § 217(e)(3)(B).
126. Id. § 217(f)(1).
127. Id. § 217(f)(2).
128. Id.
129. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 218, 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 4106, 4128 (codified at I I U.S.C. §§ 101(51B) and 362(d)(3)).
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debtor's only business is the ownership of nonresidential real estate. 130
In the 1970s and 1980s, debtors in single asset real estate cases were
typically limited partnerships formed to take advantage of liberal
tax laws.
Although there is nothing in the pre-1994 bankruptcy law that
entitles single asset debtors to any less protection, courts have found
bad faith in these filings based, in part, on the fact that only a
single asset was owned by the debtor.' The concept that owners
of a single real estate asset are entitled to less protection than other
debtors under the Bankruptcy Code has now progressed to the point
that Congress has carved out certain real estate developers as an
exception in Chapter 11 reorganizations.
13 2
Treating single asset owners differently is not new to Congress.
In 1978, the Senate's proposed version of Section 362 would have
almost insured that single asset cases would never survive. 33 The
Senate proposal provided that property was not necessary for re-
organization. If no business was conducted on the property by the
debtor, courts should grant relief from the automatic stay within
thirty days of the hearing. The only way the debtor could avoid
relaxation of the stay was to show equity in the property. The
proposed amendment simply took away from the debtor any ar-
gument that the property was necessary for reorganization. Thus,
without proof of equity, the creditor would be entitled to relief
from the automatic stay immediately. That Senate proposal died in
the House; however, bankruptcy courts proceeded to dismiss single
asset real estate cases, which courts considered abusive of the re-
organization process .134
130. Id. § 218(a).
131. Little Creek Develop. Co. v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 779 F.2d
1068 (5th Cir. 1986). Here, the court summarizes the issue of good faith, or lack
thereof, as a basis for finding: (i) cause for relief from the automatic stay under
Section 362(d)(1), or (ii) regarding dismissal or conversion of cases under Section
1112(b). Mentioning that a totality of circumstances must be reviewed, the court
notes that many appropriate candidates for "bad faith" filings include where:
The debtor has one asset, such as a tract of undeveloped or developed
real property. The secured creditors' liens encumber this tract. There are
generally no employees except for the principals, little or no cash flow,
and no available sources of income to sustain a plan of reorganization
or to make adequate protection payments ....
Id. at 1073. Thus, the court combines a bad faith analysis with factors under
Section 362(b)(1) (adequate protection) and Section 362(b)(2) (ability to reorganize).
132. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 218, 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 4106, 4128 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(51B) and
362(d)(3)).
133. S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
134. See Phoenix Piccadilly, Ltd. v. Life Ins. Co., 849 F.2d 1393 (llth Cir.
UALR LAW JOURNAL
The Supreme Court stepped into the fray in 1988 when it found
that the portion of Section 362(d)(2)(B) which mentioned effective
reorganization required that the effective reorganization be "in pros-
pect."' 35 The recommendation of the National Bankruptcy Confer-
ence on the amendment of Section 362 actually moved away from
the "necessary for effective reorganization" concept and placed
emphasis on the effect of lifting the stay on the estate and the other
creditors. 13
6
The concept that single real estate asset debtor cases should
move along more quickly than other types of cases has finally found
its way into the Bankruptcy Code in Section 218 of the Act. 3 7 The
concept is handled mechanically by adding a definition of single
asset real estate as (1) real property constituting a single property
or project, (2) which is not residential real property with fewer than
4 residential units, (3) which generates substantially all of the gross
income of a debtor, (4) on which no substantial business is being
conducted by the owner other than the business of operating the
real property, and (5) the owner has noncontingent, liquidated secured
debts in an amount of $4,000,000 or less.'38 This definition is the
same as in the 1978 Senate proposal, with the exception of the
$4,000,000 limit. 39
The use of the $4,000,000 limit is puzzling. Apparently this
limit is a corollary to the "too big to fail" rule in banking and
should be known as the "too small to reorganize" rule. 4°
Under the new Section 362(d), as amended by the Act, the
automatic stay shall be lifted as to property which constitutes single
asset real estate, unless within 90 days of filing the debtor has filed
a plan of reorganization or commenced monthly payments to each
creditor with a claim secured by the real estate.' 4' If filed, the plan
1988); In re Southwest Dev. Corp., 76 B.R. 196 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987). See
also Single Asset Real Estate in Chapter 11: Secured Creditors' Perspective and
the Need for Reform, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 133 (1993).
135. United Sav. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest, 484 U.S. 365 (1988). The
court explained, "[T]his means there must be 'a reasonable possibility of a successful
reorganization within a reasonable time."' Id. at 376.
136. THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE: CODE REVIEW PROJECT FINAL
REPORT 251 (1994).
137. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 218(b), 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 4106, 4128 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3)).
138. Id. § 218(a) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101(51B)).
139. S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
140. Ironically, the Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates project would not have
qualified under the definition, since its debt was greater than $4,000,000.
141. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 218(b), 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 4106, 4128 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3)).
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must have a reasonable possibility of being confirmed within a
reasonable time. 42 The monthly payments must equal interest com-
puted at the current market rate multiplied by the value of the
"creditor's interest in the real estate.'"1 43 Note that even if the debtor
can prove equity, the equity cannot be saved unless the plan is filed
or payments begin.
Thus, to obtain relief from the automatic stay under this amend-
ment, the secured creditor must prove all of the following:
(a) Substantially all of the debtor's gross income comes from
real property which is not residential property with fewer than
4 units; and
(b) The debtor conducts no substantial business on the prop-
erty, other than the business of operating the property; and
(c) The total noncontingent, liquidated secured debts of the
debtor are $4,000,000 or less; and
(d) The debtor has not filed within 90 days after the order
for relief (or any extension granted by the court within the 90
days):
(i) a plan which has reasonable possibility of being con-
firmed within a reasonable time; and
(ii) the debtor has not commenced monthly payments to
each creditor whose claims are secured by the real estate, in
amounts equal to interest at a current fair market rate on the
value of each creditor's interest in the real estate.'"
The failure to prove any one of these elements would relegate the
creditor to the same rules applicable to creditors of non-single asset
debtors. 141
From a creditor's point of view, this amendment may actually
slow down the creditor's rush to file motions for relief from stay.
Creditors that would normally file such motions immediately may
now want to wait until after the 90th day, knowing that the amend-
ment will provide the needed pressure to keep the debtor moving
142. Id.
143. Id. § 218(b)(3). A creditor with a $1,000,000 debt with collateral worth
$500,000 must be paid on a monthly basis the amount that is calculated by the
following formula: market interest rate x 500,000 divided by 12. In Timbers, the
Supreme Court found the phrase "value of such creditor's interest" in Section
506(a) means "the value of the collateral." Timbers, 484 U.S. at 631. Presumably,
Congress did not intend to require interest payments on a secured creditor's entire
claim (including the unsecured portion) under new Section 362(d)(3). Such a result
would directly conflict with Section 506(b) and cases interpreting it such as Timbers.
144. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 218, 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 4106, 4128 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3)).
145. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1988).
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toward a plan or payment to the secured creditors. I4 For those
purposes, the amendments may be worthwhile.
X. CONCLUSION
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 represents, once again, a
hurried and piecemeal effort to address issues raised by interpretation
of the existing Code and issues which concern special interest groups.
It remains to be seen if the amendments will accomplish any mean-
ingful, positive reform of bankruptcy law.
146. For an excellent discussion of these and other practical problems in this
area, see Roger M. Whalen & William W. Senft, The Legislative Response to
Single Asset Real Estate Bankruptcies: Critical Analysis and Some Suggestions, 1
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 157 (1993). The entire Spring 1993 issue of American
Bankruptcy Institute Law Review deals with single asset bankruptcy.
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